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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 890601-CA

v.
Category No. 2

JOHN QUAS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of murder in the
second degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989), in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Kenneth Rigtrup, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear

this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the district court have jurisdiction to review the
circuit court's decision to bind over defendant for trial, and,
by failing to timely appeal the bindover order through
interlocutory appeal, did defendant forfeit his right to appeal?
Out-of-time appeals must be dismissed.

State v. Johnson, 635

P.2d 36 (Utah 1981) .
Did the State meet the standard for refiling a criminal
information?

Since this determination by the magistrate is

highly fact-sensitive and relies on the accumulation of evidence

presented at two preliminary hearing, the magistrate's ruling
should be afforded a high degree of deference.

See generally

State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986).
Were the testimonies of experts properly admitted under
the Utah Rules of Evidence?

No contemporaneous objection was

made to their admission, and defendant as waived his right to
raise the matter on appeal.

State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35-

55 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989).

In the absence of

proper objections, this Court may determine whether the trial
court committed "plain error."

The standard to assess whether

"plain error" exists is two-part.

The error must be obvious from

an examination of the record and harmful.

I_d. at 35.

Did the trial court properly admit evidence of
defendant statements?

In reviewing a trial court's evidentiary

ruling, an appellate court will not disturb a factual finding in
the absence of clear error, and a legal conclusion will be given
no deference but reviewed under a correction of error standard.
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
granted, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah May 4, 1989).
Was testimony concerning the victim's state of mind
properly admitted?

The trial court's ruling on admissibility of

evidence will not be reversed absent a showing that the trial
court so abused its discretion as to create a likelihood that
injustice resulted.

State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168 (Utah 1985).

Did the trial court properly reject defendant's
requested "flight" jury instruction and properly instruct the
jury on the standard of reasonable doubt?

-2-

No prejudicial error

occurs if it appears that the giving or rejection of a requested
instruction would not have affected the outcome of the trial.
State v, McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1985).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The relevant statutory text is attached hereto as
Appendix A,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree,
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203
(Supp. 1989) (R. 3). That charge was dismissed at the
preliminary hearing to determine whether defendant should be
bound over to stand trial on the charges.

The State refiled the

charge, and, after the second preliminary hearing, defendant was
bound over for trial.
Defendant was convicted of second degree murder after a
jury trial (R. 589). Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of
five years to life at the Utah State Prison with an additional
term of one to five years for use of a firearm, to be served
consecutively with the other term (R. 600-01).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
At 9:41 p.m. on June 15, 1987, the Salt Lake County 911
operator received a phone call from defendant stating that his
wife, Susan Quas, had shot herself (T. 199; State's exhibits 1 &
Although defendant never specifically raises a sufficiency of
evidence issue on appeal, his brief contains representations of
the facts of the case and inferences that he draws from those
representations. Consequently, the State is including a more
thorough, though still abbreviated, statement of the facts of the
case than would normally be warranted by the appellate issues as
framed by defendant.
-3-

2).

The first police officer and paramedics arrived at

defendant's residence within four minutes of defendant's call (T.
236, 319). They found Susan Quas lying on some sheets in the
living room of the house, dead of a gunshot wound to her left eye
(T. 238-39).
Defendant said he had been in the shower, had heard a
gunshot, had come out of the shower and found his wife lying on
the living room floor (T. 241, 287-88, 338). He said he then
picked up the gun lying next to his wife, put it back down and
immediately called 911 (T. 376). He stated that he had been in
the shower for four to five minutes, had washed his hair and was
half shaven at the time he heard the shot (T. 376). He was
wearing a robe but did not appear to the investigating officers
or the paramedic to be wet.

His hair was splashed with water on

top but was not wet to the roots and appeared unwashed and messy
(T. 241, 288, 324, 339, 377). His hands were extremely dirty (T.
339, 377). His face was not halfway shaven (T. 377). His robe
and feet were dry, and there was no water on the plastic carpet
runner leading to the bathroom where defendant stood (T. 324,
339) .
The bathroom floor and the shower areas in the bathtub
were dry when checked at approximately 10:05 p.m. (T. 340).
Detective Ronald T. Edwards thoroughly check€*d the shower and
bathroom again at approximately 11:00 p.m.

He noticed that the

towels in the bathroom were dry; the sink, tub and soap dish were
dry; there were no water spills on the floor and there were no
drops of water or moisture on the glass doors of the tub (T.

-4-

381).

Subsequently Detective Edwards ran several tests on the

shower by turning it on for three to four minutes and checking it
periodically thereafter for dryness.

In those tests the shower

was wet up to 95 minutes after the water was shut off (T. 42730).

Detective Edwards also went down to the basement the night

of Susan Quas' death and discovered that the pilot light on the
water heater was off and that the heater had a note on it
indicating that the tank was empty (T. 383).
When Officer Edward Spann went to the basement, he
found the washing machine running and turned it off (T. 34).
Defendant stated to one officer that he was washing clothes for a
trip his wife and he were going to take to Tonopah, Nevada and
that he had needed to wash some pants and shirts for his suit (T.
341-42, 384, 374). He told Detective Edwards a short time later
that his wife and he had been arguing and that he had decided to
leave for two weeks and go to Tonopah (T. 375). Seven of the
thirteen items in the washer were towels, the other items
included a half-ripped t-shirt, another t-shirt, a blue shirt,
sweat pants, briefs and shorts (T. 386). There were no shirts or
pants that would normally go with a suit (T. 307, 471).
A low velocity fresh blood splatter was found on the
carpet runner going downstairs toward the washer and dryer (T.
409).

When analyzed the blood was found to be type A, the same

as Susan Quas (T. 625-26).

Defendant's blood type is B (T. 649)

Detective Edwards administered a gunshot residue test
(GSR) to defendant (T. 387). That test is used to determine
whether particles of lead, antimony or barium, which can be

-5-

discharged at the time a gun is fired are present on a person's
hands.

As he did so defendant stated that he had been
2

fertilizing his lawn all day long (T. 391).

Detective Edwards

checked the garage and found a fertilizer spreader with an opened
bag of fertilizer covered with debris. Another opened and halfgone bag was found along with an unopened bag.

The fertilizer in

the opened bags was crusted over and appeared not to have been
used for months (T. 391-92).

Lawn samples were taken from the

front and back yards along with samples of the fertilizer in each
bag (T. 393-95).

An analysis of the lawn samples revealed no

fertilizer (T. 618-19).
About an hour and a half after the arrival of the
police defendant indicated that he wanted to leave his residence,
and Officer Lamont Cox took him to the West Valley City Police
Station (T. 243). At approximately 1:20 a.rru on June 16,
Detective Edwards interviewed defendant at the police station
concerning the accounts of the evening (T. 377-78).

The

interview lasted approximately 30 minutes, and Detective Edwards
returned thereafter to defendant's residence for further
investigation.

At 6:30 a.m. on June 16, defendant was arrested

(T. 378).
Defendant was bound over to the district court to be
3
tried on the charge of second degree murder.
At trial several

See note 9, infra.
3
The procedural history and relevant facts concerning the
preliminary hearing phase of this case are provided in Point I,
infra. Because of the nature of preliminary hearing issues, some
factual information is repeated there.
-6-

witnesses testified to varying accounts defendant gave them
concerning the events surrounding his wife's death.

Defendant

told Kristine Knudson, who had moved in with him after his wife's
death, three different versions.

First, he told her he was in

the shower, heard a shot, came out, and could not tell where his
wife had been shot, so he picked up her head and put a sheet
under it (T. 498). In another version he said he was in the
shower, heard a shot, came out and knew she was already dead (T.
499).

In another, he said he was in the shower, heard a shot,

came out and walked downstairs to check the wash because he was
packing to leave (T. 499-500).

Defendant told Sherrie Mayer,

with whom he also lived after his wife's death, that his wife and
he had been fighting, that he went to pack to leave and that she
took a gun and shot herself (T. 515-16).

In another version,

defendant said he was in the shower, heard a gunshot, ran out and
found her lying dead on the floor.

He said he then took her

pulse, picked up her head and put a sheet under it (T. 517). In
another, defendant said that his wife had been standing with her
thumbs on the trigger, that the gun went off and she fell in slow
motion (T. 518). Tapes of his 911 telephone call reveal pleas
from defendant for the police and paramedics to please hurry, to
do something to save her (State's exhibits 2 and 3).
Defendant testified at trial to another version of the
events.

He stated that Susan and he had been arguing, that he

decided to leave, that he went downstairs put the clothes he
needed for the drive in the washer and came upstairs to find his
wife playing with the gun.

He testified that he went into the
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shower for two to three seconds, heard the shot, came out, knelt
down and picked up the gun and put it down on Susan's stomach.
He said he then stood up and immediately called the police (T.
824-28)However, testimonies of two neighbors, Thomas Wassmer,
and Pam Young, gave different accounts of the time between the
gunshot and the arrival of the paramedics and police. Mr.
Wassmer saw and heard defendant and his wife arguing on their
back deck and saw them go into the house.

Fifteen or 20 minutes

later he heard a gunshot and in another 20 minutes heard sirens
(T. 208-11).

Ms. Young, defendant's next-door neighbor, had gone

for a walk and was sitting on her front porch when the police
arrived.

She had been there for 15 to 20 minutes before their

arrival and had heard no gunshot (T. 220-21).

The paramedics who

responded to defendant's call estimated that Susan Quas had been
dead a minimum of 10 to 15 minutes and a maximum of 30 minutes
(T. 322-23).

As noted supra, paramedics and police arrived

within four minutes of defendant's 911 call.
At trial defendant also testified in detail concerning
the events of the whole day of his wife's death, including an
account of taking her to work at 4:00 a.m., picking her up at
3:30 - 4:00 p.m., stopping at the liquor store and test driving
two pick-up trucks (T. 817-22).

Testimony of his wife's

supervisor at work indicated that Susan Quas" had been on
vacation the day of her death (T. 870-71).

Defendant had

previously told Detective Edwards that his wife had started her
vacation the day of her death (T. 889).
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Dr. Todd Grey, the Asstistant State Medical Examiner
who did the autopsy, concluded that the manner of death was
homicide (T. 690). His conclusion was based on many factors he
observed during his investigation.

He found the location of the

wound, in the eye, and the fact the weapon was held 16 to 18
inches from the wound to be atypical of suicide (T. 676, 688-89).
He also considered Susan Quas' negative GSR result (T. 684), the
pattern of stippling (fragments of burned and unburned gunpowder)
on her face (T. 663, 675-76), the absence of "high velocity"
blood spattering, gunpowder soot or other debris on her hands
also to be atypical of suicide (T. 665-66, 678).
James Gaskill, director of the Weber State College
Crime Laboratory, analyzed Susan Quas' GSR test, administered GSR
tests on 25 other people who fired the gun that killed Susan
Quas, analyzed test firing stippling patterns, studied a
photograph of the gun firing and conferred with Dr. Grey (T. 545,
548, 611). He concluded that it was "very unlikely that [Susan
Quas] fired the gun" (T. 612).
After the close of the evidence, the jury returned a
guilty verdict.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court below correctly decided that it did not have
jurisdiction to review the circuit court's decision to bind this
case over for trial.
By failing to timely appeal the bindover order,
defendant has forfeited his right of appellate review.
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The State met the Brickey standard for refiling an
information.
The testimonies of Dr. Todd Grey and Brent Marchant
were properly admitted and did not violate Utah Rules of Evidence
702, 404 and 403.
The trial court properly admitted the evidence of
defendant's statements that defendant challenges on appeal
because defendant was not in custody when the statment was made..
Testimony concerning Susan Quas's state of mind prior
to her death was properly admitted.
The trial court properly rejected to defendant's
requested "flight" jury instruction and properly instructed the
4
jury on reasonable doubt.
Defendant attempts to raise six appellate issues. However, his
brief is sprinkled with several complaints about law enforcement,
the prosecution, and the trial court that not only fail to frame
appeal issues but also are unfounded as incomplete or distorted
renditions of the record and often lacking in legal analysis.
Cases are cited that have no application to the record. See Br.
of App. n.25 and supplement.
Indeed, this Court's review of the record will disclose
substantial hard work and professionalism in preparing this case,
not an "alchemic" process suggested by defendant. For example,
contrary to defendant's assertion (Br. of App. n.25), a review of
Sgt. Spann's testimony at the preliminary heciring and trial
reveals no material differences. Even if Sgt. Spann testified in
greater detail at trial, the defense not only had access to his
police report before the preliminary hearing but also had ample
opportunity to cross examine him then. Defendant's suggestion of
surprise is overreaching, and there was no objection at trial.
Moreover, with respect to Detective Edwards, the record shows
absolutely no inappropriate treatment of any witness, and had a
good faith reasonable basis for any questions asked. It is well
settled that the exclusionary rule for witnesses accommodates the
special responsibilities of the principal investigating officer,
see, e.g., Advisory Committee Note, Fed. Rules of Evid. 615
(adopted verbatim in Utah); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 892
n.20 (Utah 1989). Judge Rigtrup so recognized. The reckless
innuendo pervading defendant's brief rings hollow in light of the
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT IT DID
NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE CIRCUIT
COURT'S DECISION TO BIND THIS CASE OVER FOR
TRIAL.
A.

Procedural History

On June 16, 1987, defendant was charged with murder in
the second degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203
(Supp. 1989) (R. 3). The preliminary hearing to determine
whether defendant would be bound over to stand trial on the
charge was held on June 23 and 31, 1987, before Judge Eleanor Van
Sciver, in the Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake County.

On August

3, 1987 the case was dismissed because of insufficient evidence
(R. 3). On July 5, 1988, the information charging defendant with
murder in the second degree was refiled (R. 255-57) based on and
additional evidence.

A second preliminary hearing was held on

October 21, 1988, before Judge Van Sciver.

On October 24, 1988,

defendant was bound over to the Third Judicial District Court to
stand trial as charged.

Defendant filed a motion to quash the

bindover order in the district court on November 17, 1988 (R.
268).

The State filed a motion to strike defendant's motion to

quash the bindover on December 19, 1988 (R. 285). On January 6,
1989, the trial court granted the State's motion on the ground

Cont. responsible and meticulous manner in which the State
prepared and presented this case.
The State has elected to address the appeal questions
specifically raised and adds this note to advise the Court that
there is no State concession to the accuracy or validity of the
random and gratuitous assertions in defendant's brief.
-11-

that it lacked jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing (R. 327). On January 26,
1989, defendant filed a petition for permission to appeal from
the January 6, 1989 interlocutory order of the district court
with the Utah Supreme Court.

That Court denied defendant's

petition on February 10, 1989.
B.

The District Court Lacks Jurisdiction
To Review The Bindover Order of the
Circuit Court.

Defendant argues that the district court has
jurisdiction to review the evidentiary sufficiency of bindover
orders of the circuit court.

That precise legal issue recently

has been addressed by this Court in State v. Humphrey, No.
890424-CA, State v. Gordon, No. 890130-CA (Utah Ct. App. June 14,
1990).

There, this Court ruled that the district court lacks

jurisdiction to review bindover orders from the circuit court.
That ruling specifically disposes of defendant's jurisdiction
argument.
POINT II
BY FAILING TO TIMELY APPEAL THE BINDOVER
ORDER, DEFENDANT HAS FORFEITED HIS RIGHT OF
APPELLATE REVIEW.
The Utah Supreme Court is exclusively vested with
jurisdiction to review "interlocutory appeals from any court of
record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (Supp. 1989).

If the defendant

wished review of the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the
preliminary hearing, he should have filed a timely interlocutory
appeal from the circuit court order with the Utah Supreme Court.

-12-

State v. Schreuder, 712 P,2d 264, 270 (Utah 1985)-

As the

Supreme Court held in Schreuder, Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(c)
(Supp. 1989) (previously § 77-35-26(b)(3)) governs appeals from
bindover orders of circuit courts and grants a defendant the
right to petition for an interlocutory appeal from the order.
Rule 5(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Supp. 1989),
mandates that such an appeal be taken within 20 days after the
entry of the order.

Defendant, in filing a motion to quash the

bindover in the district court, forfeited his right to appeal the
order through proper channels by failing to timely file the
interlocutory appeal.

See State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37

(Utah 1981) ("The . . . period for filing a notice of appeal . .
. is jurisdictional and cannot be enlarged by this Court. Outof-time appeals must be dismissed.").
Therefore, it is now improper for defendant to raise
any issues concerning the bindover order, and this Court should
decline to entertain such arguments.
POINT III
THE STATE MET THE BRICKEY STANDARD FOR
REFILING AN INFORMATION.
This Court should not review substantively the circuit
court's analysis of the adequacy of the evidence presented at the
second preliminary hearing.

Nevertheless, a review of the

standard for protection of defendant's due process rights in the
refiling of criminal charges, as articulated by the Utah Supreme
Court in State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), will
illustrate that the State produced much more than the quantum of
evidence necessary to meet that standard.
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Defendant urges this Court to adopt a position that
would require the prosecutor to refile an information only if
there is evidence "not reasonably available at the first
preliminary hearing" (Br. of App. at 21).

Though never

specifically stated, the clear implication throughout defendant's
argument is that any evidence that conceivably could have been
obtained at the time of the first preliminary hearing should not
be used to assess whether the prosecution has met the Brickey
standard.

In essence, defendant seeks to create a new procedural

due process right for defendants where prosecutors are barred
from refiling a charge unless new evidence "jumps out of the
bushes."

The magistrate specifically rejected such a strict

requirement at the second preliminary hearing, and the governing
legal authority has not imposed such a burden (PH2. 147, 151).
"[D]ue process considerations prohibit a prosecutor
from refiling criminal charges earlier dismissed for insufficient
evidence unless the prosecutor can show that new or previously
unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good cause
justified refiling."

Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647.

In addition,

"the prosecutor must, whenever possible, refile the charges
before the same magistrate, who . . . .
matter de novo . . . ."

[will] not consider the

The Court characterized these

requirements as a "relatively small burden."
of these tests in the instant case.

The State met both

The Court in Brickey was

guided by Oklahoma courts, particularly Jones v. State, 481 P.2d
169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).

There, charges were dismissed

against the defendant at his first preliminary hearing.
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The case

was refiled, this time before a new magistrate, and the same
evidence from the first preliminary hearing was offered.
the second hearing, the defendant was bound over.

After

The Oklahoma

court found this procedure to be improper and criticized the
practice of magistrate "shopping", stating that the State must,
if possible, refile before the same magistrate and offer
"additional evidence or prove . . . other good cause."
171•

Id. at

Subsequent to Jones, the Oklahoma court expanded on the

issue of what constituted "additional newly discovered evidence"
and its rationale.

The Court stated:

We point out . . . that the Jones v. State
. . . decision does not preclude the district
attorney from offering for further
consideration—a charge—which was dismissed
at an earlier preliminary examination, when
additional newly discovered evidence is later
obtained; meaning, however, such evidence
that with due diligence could have been
available at the first preliminary
examination.
That decision merely requires that the
prosecutor may not take his dismissed case—
with the same evidence—refile it—and submit
it to a magistrate more likely to be
favorable. That decision requires that the
first magistrate, who considered the
information and evidence; and rendered a
decision; shall consider the good cause
offered and the new evidence, in relation to
that upon which his earlier decision was
premised. In short, for good cause shown,
and subject to the presentment of new
evidence, the charge may be refiled.
Harper v. District Court, 484 P.2d 891, 897 (Okla. 1971)
(emphasis added).

See also, Chase v. State, 517 P.2d 1142 (Okla.

Crim. App. 1973) (where discovery of prison record error after
first preliminary hearing found to be sufficient good cause why
evidence not acquired and introduced at the first preliminary
hearing).
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It is instructive also that the Utah Supreme Court, in
adopting the Oklahoma standard in Brickey, cited with approval
the Harper holding "that good cause to continue a preliminary
hearing for further investigation might exist when a prosecutor
innocently miscalculates the quantum of evidence required to
obtain a bindover and further investigation clearly would not be
dilatory. " Brickeyf 714 P.2d at 647 n.5.

Therefore, in applying

the Brickey standard, the State should be permitted to present
all evidence that may have been available earlier but was not
presented on the mistaken assumption that the evidence actually
presented would be sufficient to establish probable cause.

This

follows from the understanding in this jurisdiction and elsewhere
that the State often does not present all of its evidence at a
preliminary hearing.

Indeed, the State in this case went even

further by performing extensive new tests involving the weapon at
issue in this case and in presenting evidence after the first
preliminary hearing that could not have been available at that
time.

In fact, the State still maintains that the evidence presented
in the instant case at the first preliminary hearing was amply
sufficient to establish the requisite probable cause
determination.
"The prosecution is not required to introduce its entire case
at the hearing . . . ." State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 786
(Utah 1980). "There is always a presumption that the State will
strengthen its evidence at trial by production of everything
favorable to support the charge." Matricia v. State, 726 P.2d
900, 903 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986). Indeed, "the burden of putting
on evidence at a preliminary hearing may be met entirely through
circumstantial evidence." State v. Maynard, 596 P.2d 893, 893
(Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (quoting Berryhill v. State, 568 P.2d
1306, 1310 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977)).
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In the instant case, where the State refiled the
information before the same magistrate, the State presented more
than enough new or previously unavailable evidence at the second
preliminary hearing to meet the Brickey standard*

A summary of

the evidence presented at each hearing will so demonstrate.

At

the first preliminary hearing, held on July 23 and 31, 1987, the
State presented evidence through four witnesses and five
exhibits.
Officer Brooke Plotnick of the West Valley Police
Department testified that he received the dispatch call for this
incident at 9:41 p.m. on June 15, 1987, and arrived at
defendant's residence at 9:45 (Preliminary Hearing 1 (PHI.) 7).
He observed Susan Quas lying on a sheet with a gunshot wound in
her eye (PHI. 19). Officer Plotnick also spoke with and observed
defendant.

Defendant told Officer Plotnick that he had been in

the shower, heard a bang noise, exited the shower, and found his
wife on the living room floor (PHI. 10). However, Officer
Plotnick, who was within two feet of defendant when he made these
statements, testified that defendant did not appear to have
showered because the defendant's hands and face were dirty and
because his hair was dirty and dry in parts and not soaked as if
it had been washed (PHI. 10-11).

Finally, based upon his

experience in responding to suicide-by-gunshot cases, Officer
Plotnick testified that Susan Quas's death did not appear to be a
suicide because there was an absence of blood spattering around
the body and an absence of gunpowder on her face, and because the
position of the body was inconsistent with suicide (PHI. 15).

-17-

Detective Ronald T. Edwards, a 9-year veteran of the
West Valley Police Department, testified that he was called to
investigate this matter and arrived at about 10:15 p.m. on June
15, 1987, at defendant's residence (PHI. 25). He observed and
talked with defendant within twenty-five minutes of arriving
(PHI. 28, 51). Defendant told Detective Edwards that he had been
arguing with his wife throughout the evening and that the
fighting had escalated.

Defendant said he told his wife that he

was leaving for Tonopah, Nevada, that he went into the bedroom,
took off his clothes, put on his bathrobe, and went downstairs to
put his clothes in the washer (PHI. 34). Defendant told Edwards
that he came back upstairs and observed his wife "dry-firing" the
weapon and that she said she would kill herself if he left for
Nevada.

Defendant said he then went to the bathroom to take a

shower, was in the shower for four to five minutes and heard an
explosion.

Defendant then said he ran out of the shower,

observed his wife, picked up the gun, put it back down, and then
made a telephone call to 911 (PHI. 35).
In spite of defendant's representations about
showering, Detective Edwards observed that his hands and
fingernails were dirty (Detective Edwards noted a grease mark on
the right hand) and that his hair was dirty and sticking out on
the side (PHI. 32, 49-51).

Detective Edwards testified that Mr.

Quas did not appear to have showered and that he also inspected
defendant's bathroom and shower at about 11:00 p.m. and found
that the towels, sink, shower door, shower soap dish tray, and
the shower itself were all dry (PHI. 36, 41-42).
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On June 26, 1987, Detective Edwards performed a test on
the shower at defendant's residence.

He turned it on for three

to four minutes, turned it off, and inspected it at five minute
increments up to thirty minutes. After thirty minutes the shower
was still wet, including the shower nozzle, handles, wall, and
soap cup (PHI. 40-41).
Robert W. Brinkman, a criminalist for the State of Utah
Crime Laboratory, conducted test firings of the gun involved in
this case.

Those tests served as one basis for the expert

testimony of Dr. Todd Grey.

Mr. Brinkman also testified

concerning the stippling or so-called "tattooing" phenomenon,
which describes the penetration of the flesh with powder
particles from the muzzle of the weapon (PHI. 173). He said that
he would be surprised to find stippling unless the muzzle of the
gun is within six to nine inches of the flesh (PHI. 175).
Dr. Todd Grey, Assistant Medical Examiner, State of
Utah, examined the body of Susan Quas and prepared an autopsy
report (PHI. 109). In his training and experience as of July
1987, Dr. Grey had viewed approximately 400 homicide cases and
200 to 300 gunshot wound suicide cases, and he personally had
performed examinations of 100 to 200 gunshot wound suicide
victims and of 100 gunshot wound homicide victims.

He concluded

that the manner of death in this case was homicide (PHI. 148).
His conclusion was based on the angle of the wound, its location
and the pattern of stippling around the wound (PHI. 110, 143-44,
151-52).

He also testified that in his experience suicide wounds

were almost always contact wounds or wounds inflicted within one
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or two inches of the body (PHI. 93, 157-58).

In the instant

case, based on a comparison of the stippling on Susan Quas' face
and test firing patterns, Dr. Grey estimated that the muzzle of
the gun was sixteen to eighteen inches from her face (PHI. 99,
110-11) .
Although the foregoing was sufficient for Dr. Grey to
reach his opinion, he mentioned as further support GSR test
results from the State Crime Lab.

This information concerned a

GSR test that Dr. Grey performed on Susan Quas and the State
Crime Lab analyzed.

The Court sustained defendant's objection to
7
Dr. Grey's referring to these test results (PHI. 101-04).
Despite the medical examiner's expert opinion that the manner of
death was homicide, the circuit court found that the State had
not established probable cause and granted defendant's motion to
dismiss (PHI. 1810).
The second preliminary hearing was held before the same
circuit court judge in accordance with the Brickey proscription
against judge shopping.

Complying with the Brickey requirement

that that hearing not be a de novo consideration, the State did
not reintroduce evidence, by way of exhibits or testimony,
submitted at the first preliminary hearing.

At the second

hearing, held on October 21, 1988, the State presented twelve new
exhibits and five new witnesses, as well as additional testimony
by Detective Edwards and Dr. Grey.

The testimony of James

Gaskill from the Weber State Crime Lab and Kristine Knudson,
7
Utah R. Evid. 703 permits an expert such as Dr. Grey to rely on
such information and to testify about such reliances. The
circuit court's ruling to the contrary was erroneous.
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defendant's ex-girlfriend, most clearly met the Brickey
standards.

The State's objective, in light of the unexpected

ruling at the first preliminary hearing, was to meet Brickey but
o

also to leave no doubt about probable cause.
James Gaskill, director of the crime laboratory at
Weber State College, testified to GSR tests he performed with the
gun in question after the first preliminary hearing.

This work

involved many hours organizing test firings and analyzing GSR
tests with an electro microscope.

He did 25 test firings from

the gun and took GSR tests from those who fired the gun and
people in the vicinity.

There was gunshot residue on the hands

all 25 persons who fired the gun.

No gunshot residue was found

on the hands of the four persons tested who did not fire the gun
(Preliminary Hearing 2 (PH2) 90-93).

The GSR taken on Susan Quas

was negative (PH2. 94). This led Mr. Gaskill to conclude that it
was "highly unlikely" that she had fired the gun.

Mr. Gaskill

also testified that he would expect stippling from a hand gun to
go out to a minimum of 18 inches, specifically disagreeing with
Robert Brinkman's testimony at the first preliminary hearing that
stippling would go out only six to nine inches from a hand gun
(PH2. 101-02).

Mr. Gaskill accordingly offered new scientific

o

Defendant's repeated reference to the prosecutor's statement
about the "review issue later on" is taken completely out of
context. This statement occurred during a calloquy between
counsel and Judge Van Sciver and used as a reminder that the
State wished to present the results of Mr. Gaskill's tests, as
well as other evidence to establish probable cause and to meet
the Brickey refiling requirement. To misinterpret a preliminary
colloquy between counsel and the court as a basis to conclude
Brickey was not met, is not only illogical but ignores the
substantial new and additional evidence presented (Br. of App. at
22).
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evidence to support probable cause•
Kristine Knudson, who had moved in with defendant in
September 1987, testified to three conversations she had had with
defendant concerning his wife's death.

Each conversation

occurred after the first preliminary hearing, and, therefore, was
unavailable at that hearing (PH2. 75-78).

Those conversations

give three different renditions of what had occurred, and those
stories were different than the ones defendant told to the police
the night of Susan Quas' death (PH2. 75-78).

Ms. Knudson, in a

sense, did "jump out of the bushes" and helped meet the Brickey
requirement.
David Farr, forensic photographer at the Utah State
Crime Lab, also testified to his successful photographing of the
gun that inflicted the wound to Susan Quas on August 25, 1988
with an electronic flash to capture an image of gas emissions
when the gun was fired.

That photograph was admitted into

evidence (PH2. 67-73).
Dr. Todd Grey testified that he had not changed his
opinion from the first preliminary hearing that the manner of
Susan Quas' death was homicide.

He cited the original evidence

that he had used and the additional evidence of the negative GSR
test, the results of Mr. Gaskill's tests and the photograph of
the test firing of the gun (PH2. 122-29).

Dr. Grey's opinion,

therefore, was supported by new evidence.
Detective Edwards, who had testified at the first
preliminary hearing, elaborated on his prior testimony and
testified concerning new evidence.
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He testified that he had

looked at the only hot water heater in the basement of
defendant's residence and discovered that the water had been shut
off and the pilot light was out (PH2. 30-33). He also testified
that he had recovered items being washed in the washing machine
at the time of his arrival at defendant's residence and that 7 of
the 13 items in the washing machine were towels, in contrast to
defendant's statement that he had been washing clothes for an
imminent trip to Tonopah, Nevada (PH2. 34-35).

He testified that

there was no blood spattering on Susan Quas' hand or arm, which
surprised him and which he expected to see in the event of a
suicide, but that he did find fresh blood on the carpet runner in
the main hallway of the house and down into the basement (PH2.
35-39).

That blood was analyzed later and determined to be type

A, the same type as Susan Quas' blood (PH2. 100-101).

After

administering a GSR to defendant, at which time defendant stated
that he had fertilized the lawn that day (implying that any
9
residue on his hands would have come from fertilizer),
Detective Edwards checked defendant's garage and found three bags
of fertilizer.

One was unopened and one buried under debris. A

quarter bag was inside the fertilizer spreader, but the spreader
was rusted and appeared not to have been used within several
months.

The remainder of that bag was caked from moisture, and

no empty fertilizer bags were in the garbage (PH2. 39-40).
Detective Edwards readministered a water test on the shower on

A prior GSR test, no longer in use at the time of Susan Quas'
death, would have tested false positive for the nitrites and
nitrates found in fertilizer. Unbeknownst to defendant, the test
now used would not show positive results for those chemicals.
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August 20, 1988. He turned the shower on for two to three
minutes, turned it off and returned approximately one hour and 35
minutes later.

At that time he found water in the seal, the soap

dish and between the two glass doors (PH2. 41-42).

Detective

Edwards also testified concerning the gunfiring test he performed
that day to ascertain whether Pam Young, defendant's neighbor,
could have heard a gunshot from defendant's residence as well as
photograph tests made with the gun at the Utah State Crime Lab
(PH2. 42-48).
Pam Young, defendant's next door neighbor, testified
that she had been at home during the early evening of June 15,
1987 and had gone for a walk around the neighborhood with a
friend between 8:30 p.m. and 9:00-9:05 p.m.

At 9:05 she walked

by defendant's residence and saw defendant inside without a shirt
on, doing something in the living room (PH2. 7-10).

She then sat

on her front porch until the police arrived fifteen to twenty
minutes later.

During that time she had heard no sounds, no

shouting and no gunshot (PH2. 11). When Detective Edwards
visited her in August 1988 and had the gun that shot defendant's
wife fired in defendant's residence, without telling Ms. Young
that it would be fired, she clearly heard the shot (PH2. 12).
Sergeant Russell E. Spann of the West Valley City
Police testified that he arrived at defendant's residence at 9:48
p.m. on June 15, 1987 and talked with defendant within three to
five minutes after his arrival (PH2. 17-18).

Defendant had

stated that he had been in the shower when he heard a shot, came
out and called 911.

Sgt. Spann testified that although
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defendant's hair was damp, it was not soaked and defendant's
hands were extremely dirty (PH2. 19-20).

Sgt. Spann also noticed

that the plastic carpet runner going down the hallway to the
bathroom was dry and that the bathroom floor, shower, bath tub
and side walls also were dry.

He made his inspection within 15

minutes of his arrival (PH2. 20).
The evidence submitted by the State at the second
preliminary hearing, especially the evidence from Mr. Gaskill,
Ms. Knudson and Dr. Grey, clearly satisfied the Brickey standard
of producing "new or previously unavailable" evidence. Moreover,
the evidence was sufficient to meet the probable cause
requirements for binding over defendant to stand trial because it
established a "prima face case" from which a jury "could conclude
the defendant was guilty of the offense as charged."
612 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1980).

Anderson,

The circuit court's finding that

the State met the Brickey requirement and established probable
cause was correct (PH2. 152).
POINT IV
THE TESTIMONIES OF DR. TODD GREY AND BRENT
MARCHANT WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED AND DID NOT
VIOLATE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 702, 404 AND
403.
Defendant argues that 702, 404 and 403, Utah Rules of
Evidence were violated by the admission of the testimonies of Dr.
Todd Grey, Assistant State Medical Examiner at the time of his
investigation in this case, and Brent Marchant, a Contract
Investigator for the State Medical Examiner's Office.

No

contemporaneous objection to their testimonies was made at trial,
and, therefore, defendant has waived his right to raise the
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matter on appeal.

State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah),

cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989).

Defendant mentions, without

explanation or analysis, that this Court should evaluate his
position because the trial court committed "plain error" in
allowing in the questioned testimonies (Br. of App. at 33 n.31.)
There is no need to reach a plain error analysis, so
the State will address it only briefly here.
Rules of Evidence, provides:

Rule 103(d), Utah

"Nothing in this rule precludes

taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights
although they were not brought to the attention of the court."
The Utah Supreme Court, in interpreting rule 103(d), has
established a two-part test to determine a finding of plain
error.

First, the error must be "plain," that is, from

examination of the record it should be obvious that the trial
court was committing error.

Second, the error must have affected

the substantial rights of the accused, that is, the error must
have been harmful.

Eldredge, 77 3 P.2d at 35.

Defendant's reliance on rules 702, 404 and 403 to
support a "plain error" finding is misplaced.

Rule 702, which

governs the admission of expert testimony, reads as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of opinion or
otherwise.
Extensive foundation was laid for the testimonies by Dr. Grey and
Mr. Marchant (T. 651-53, 475-78).

Each spoke from his own

experience in investigations of gunshot homicides and suicides.
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Based on his experience and review of evidence in the instant
case, Dr. Grey concluded, based on a variety of factors, that the
manner of Susan Quas' death was homicide (T. 688, 90).

Mr.

Marchant did not even express an opinion as to the manner of
Susan Quas' death.

He testified only that he considered her

wounds unusual and that he had seen only one instance of suicide
in which the victim was shot in the eye (T. 479-82).

Both

witnesses' testimonies were properly admitted under rule 702
requirements and they were both clearly entitled to rely on their
experiences under rule 703, Utah Rules of Evidence.
Defendant erroneously states that the prosecutor represented
to the jurors that the experts had reached professional opinions
on defendant's guilt and that this violated defendant's right to
a jury trial (Br. of App. at 38[2]). In so stating, defendant
quoted from the State's closing argument out of context. The
pertinent exerpt follows:
There were Mr. Gaskill's opinion that it
was highly unlikely that Susan fired the gun,
the opinion of an experienced criminalist;
Dr. Grey's opinion that the manner of death
was homicide, the opinions of an experienced
pathologist who's examined hundreds of
gunshot suicides and homicides and whose job
it is — this is his job to determine — the
manner of death; an opinion he holds without
a doubt; an opinion he holds with as much as
or more certainty than you need to have. And
a combination of opinions from a leading
criminalist and the State's medical examiner,
that Susan Quas did not fire the weapon.
(T. 945-46) (emphasis added).
(Br. of App. at 35.[2]) Defendant misrepresents the argument.
The argument is strictly limited to Dr. Grey's determination on
the manner of death. It makes no comment on and no inference
concerning who caused the death or on guilt. It was a fair
comment on the evidence presented. Dr. Grey testified that he
held his opinion on manner of death without a doubt (T. 690).
Note also that defense counsel did not object to any of the
State's closing argument nor even responded to this statement in
closing argument for the defendant.
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Defendant's rule 404 objection is also flawed.

That

rule governs the limited instances when admission of character
evidence of an accused, a victim or a witness is proper.

Without

explanation or reference to the transcript, defendant alleges
that the "prosecution was allowed to inform the jurors that Susan
Quas's conduct on the night of her death could be deduced from
the character, or traditional past conduct, of other people."
(Br. of App. at 38. [1]) The prosecutor made no such argument,
and, even if he had, rule 404 cannot be applied to address
character evidence concerning persons other than those specified
in the rule.
Finally, defendant states that rule 403 was violated in
allowing jurors to be distracted from their duty in the instant
case with evidence of other cases (Br. of App. at 38).

Rule 403

allows the exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion or waste of time.12 No evidence of other

Defendant may be implying that the expert testimony relating
to the manner of Susan Quas' death is character evidence. If so,
defendant only demonstrates a lack of understanding of different
categories of evidence and rules 702 and 404.
12
Defendant seems to rely on State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah
1986), to support this assertion as well as his assertions
concerning rule 702. However, defendant offers no analysis or
explanation of his reliance on that case. In Rammel the trial
court permitted a police officer to testify, as an expert, that
it was not unusual for a criminal suspect to lie because in his
experience no criminal suspect has admitted "right off the bat"
to committing a crime. Jd. at 500. The Utah Supreme Court found
the trial court's ruling erroneous because expert foundation was
lacking for such an opinion and, even if relevant as impeachment
evidence, its potential for prejudice substantially outweighed
its probative value. Id. at 501. Defendant may be attempting to
equate the unfounded non-expert testimony in Rammel to the wellfounded expert testimony here. If so, the equation is
unsupported and unsupportable.
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cases was presented, and the expert testimony complained of by
defendant here was neither unfairly prejudicial, confusing or a
waste of time. Application of rule 403 is not warranted,
especially in light of the strong basis in rule 703 to admit such
evidence.

Indeed, rule 703 is plainly dispositive on this issue.
The testimonies of Dr. Grey and Mr. Marchant were well-

founded, and the witnesses spoke from their personal observation
of physical evidence, their experiences and expertise.
no error.

There was

Moreover, defendant's "plain error" assertion is

meritless; he has not satisfied either the obviousness or the
prejudice prongs of the plain error test set forth in Eldredge.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS THAT
DEFENDANT CHALLENGES ON APPEAL BECAUSE
DEFENDANT WAS NOT IN CUSTODY WHEN THE
STATEMENTS WERE MADE.
On May 16, 1987, defendant filed a motion to suppress:
any and all statements by the defendant, and
fruits of any such statements, made in
violation of the defendant's rights under the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, Article I, Section 12 of the
Utah Constitution, and Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Grounds for this motion are that the
defendant invoked his right to have an
attorney present during questioning by
Detective Ron Edwards on June 15, 1987, [sic]
but Detective Edwards continued to question
the defendant nonetheless.
(R. 412).
Although the motion itself is broadly worded, the
grounds asserted for the motion specify only the statements made
to Detective Edwards. At the hearing on the motion to suppress
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of May 22, 1989, evidence and argument were limited to statements
made by defendant at the West Valley Police Department during an
interview with Detective Edwards between 1:20 a.m. and 1:45 a.m.
on June 16, 1987.

Defendant was arrested at approximately 6:15-

6:30 a.m. that morning, four and one-half hours after his
interview (S.H. 73).
Following presentation of evidence and arguments, the
trial court made the following factual findings:
While the West Valley Police were at the home
of defendant (the purported scene of the
crime), defendant indicated he wanted to
leave. It would appear, though the record is
very unclear, that Officer Lamont Cox asked
defendant if he wanted to go to the West
Valley Police Station, and defendant
responded in the affirmative. Thereafter,
apparently Officer Cox transported defendant
to the station where he remained for
approximately 2 hours, free to do as he
liked, and without any restraint or activity
of any kind. No one advised defendant he was
being arrested, and there is nothing in the
record to indicate there was even an
appearance of arrest.
About two hours later, Officer Ron
Edwards, who had been at defendant's home all
the time that defendant was at the station,
arrived at the station. He arrived shortly
after 1:00 a.m., June 16, 1988 [sic], and
found Quas in the line-up room. No one had
interviewed the defendant at the station
prior to that time. He asked defendant Quas
if he had someone who could pick him up.
Quas replied MRuss Wagner." Officer Edwards
told him he could use the phone to call
Wagner about picking him up. He also told
Quas he was not under arrest, and that he was
free to leave. Following that, Officer
Edwards took the recorded statement received
herein as EX D-l. It appears to the Court
that the interview took approximately 30
minutes.
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(R. 446-47).

Based on those factual findings the trial court

concluded that there had been no custodial interrogation and
denied defendant's motion.
On appeal defendant alleges the trial court erroneously
denied his motion to supress. He also argues that all statements
made by defendant at his home to police officers prior to the
recorded West Valley Police Department interview with Detective
Edwards should also be suppressed.

However, no contemporaneous

objection to their admission was made at trial, and those
statements played no part in the pre-trial suppression hearing.
Rule 103(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, requires that "a clear and
definite objection" be made at trial to preserve an evidentiary
error for appeal.

State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 24, 34-35 (Utah),

cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989).

Thus, defendant waived his

right to challenge the admission of those statements.

Even if

this Court should determine that the matter of the prior
statements is properly before it at this stage of the
proceedings, the issue of their admissibility would be subsumed
under the trial court's ruling since the indices of "custody"
would have been even less at defendant's own residence earlier in
the evening than at the police station.
reflects. 13

The trial record so

At the suppression hearing, Detective Edwards testified that
when defendant requested to leave his residence, Detective
Edwards instructed Officer Lamont Cox to ask defendant if he
wanted to go to the "P.D. or somewhere" (SH. 60). Defendant
chose to go to the police department but he was free to stay or
go elsewhere.
-31-

In reviewing the trial court's evidentiary ruling, this
Court applies the following standard:
In considering the trial court's action in
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we
will not disturb its factual evaluation
unless the findings are clearly erroneous . .
. . The trial judge is in the best position
to assess the credibility and accuracy of the
witnesses' divergent testimonies. . . .
However, in assessing the trial court's legal
conclusions based upon its factual findings,
we afford it no deference but apply a
'correction of error' standard, . . .
Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App., cert, granted, 108
Utah Adv. Rep. 62 (Utah May 4, 1989) (citations omitted); see
also State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 122 (Utah 1983); State v.
Galleqos, 716 P.2d 207, 208-09 (Utah 1985); State v. Ashe, 745
P.2d 1255, 1268-69 (Utah 1987) (which suggest that the "clearly
erroneous" standard applies to the trial court's factual
evaluation and its legal conclusion).
The issue before the trial court at the suppression
hearing was whether defendant was subject to a "custodial
interrogation" by Detective Edwards.14 In Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), the United States Supreme Court stated
that "by custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way."

The "relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man

in the suspect's position would have understood his situation."
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984).

This issue is not waiver, as defendant suggests, but custody.
-32-

The leading decision concerning the nature of "custody"
is Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).

In that case, a

police officer asked the defendant to meet at a state patrol
office.

Upon defendant's arrival, the officer took the defendant

into a room, told him that he was not under arrest, closed the
door, informed the defendant that he was a suspect in a burglary
and falsely told defendant that his fingerprints had been found
at the burglary scene.

Thereafter, defendant confessed to the

burglary.
The United States Supreme Court upheld defendant's
conviction, which was based in part on the confession, because
there was "no indication that the questioning took place in a
context where respondent's freedom to depart was restricted in
any way."

Td.

The Court found the false statement about

fingerprints irrelevant to the custody question.

jEd. at 495-96.

Captivity is the necessary ingredient and predicate to the
compulsion protected by the fifth amendment.
The "noncustodial situation" in Mathiason was "not
converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because a
reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal
arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took
place in a 'coercive environment.'"

_Id. at 495. Miranda

warnings are not required "simply because the questioning takes
place in the station house, or because the questioned person is
one who is the police suspect."

Ld.

See also California v.

Behler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (where Miranda warnings were
not required when a suspect voluntarily came to a police station,

-33-

the Court stated "the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is
a 'formal arrest or restraint in freedom of movement' of the
degree associated with a formal arrest, . . . ."

(citations

omitted)).
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in State v.
Shuman, 639 P.2d 155 (Utah 1981), ruling that M[w]hen defendant
willingly accompanied the deputy to the sheriff's office and
while he remained there to speak with the sheriff and the
psychologist, he was not in custody because he had not been
placed under arrest or given any indication that he would have
been compelled to go if he had resisted or been restrained from
leaving if he had desired."

Id., at 157.

Following Shuman, the court elaborated on factors it
considered when
determining whether an accused who has not
been formally arrested is in custody. They
are: (1) the site of interrogation; (2)
whether the investigation focused on the
accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of
arrest were present; and (4) the length and
form of interrogation. . . .
Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983)
(emphasis added).

The Court referred to "indicia of arrest" as

"readied handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns."

Ld.

It also

made it clear that "an investigation cannot become accusatory
until there is a likelihood that a crime has been committed."
Id.

In light of Carner, it is important to note that here

defendant was accused of nothing at the time of his interview
with Detective Edwards and that at that time it had not been
ascertained yet that a crime had been committed.
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.*w- ~_.- * ell you

Edwards:

Where does he live at.

Quas:

I would have to call him on the
phone.

Edwards:

What is his phone number.

Quas:

Well see I have it written down in
the little brown book I have at
home. I would let you guys know
anything that you want to know.

Edwards:

Well, the thing it is you can call
him from here and have him come
pick you up.

(T. 9-10).

Detective Edwards also testified that before the

taped interview he had asked defendant if he wanted someone to
come and pick him up at the police department.

Defendant had

said yes, Russell Wagner, who lived in Kearns and whose number
defendant did not know.

Detective Edwards looked up the number,

wrote it on a piece of paper and gave it to defendant (SH. 70).
At the same hearing Detective Edwards testified that
some time after the police arrived at defendant's residence,
defendant told Officer Lamont Cox that he wanted to leave his
residence.

When Officer Cox relayed the request to Detective

Edwards he was told to ask the defendant if he wanted to go to
the "P.D. or somewhere."

Subsequently, defendant got dressed and

was taken by the police to the West Valley Police Station (S.H.
68).

Detective Edwards stated that he imagined defendant would

have been free to leave his residence if he had so desired but
that the matter had not even crossed anyone's minds at that point
(S.H. 69). He also stated that defendant was not under arrest at
the time of the interview at the police station, that he had been
told so and was free to leave afterwards (S.H. 71). Detective
-36-
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I t--s Supreme Court
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:* ,
efendant raise or analyze the issu<=»
under the L : a: roristitu' ' - r
Without such analysis this cu
traditionally wiJl not consider it on appeal. State v. Johnscr ,
771 P.2d at 328. Defendant cites the dicta in State v. Crank,
142
, T-.J 1~8 (Utah !^"3) as supporting an article 1, section 12
analysis of r r ^ i involved in the presentation of custodial
statements
r: , w£ App. at 42 », As c .'ted Crank is concerned
solely with t 10 competency of a confess,^n. Here defendant did
not confess and there was no issue of v< ;untariness. Thi^,
application of Crank t«. the present las^ . - ' fplc'
Detective ^awards testitieo
.irec examinatit
in;' at the
police station defendant statec i _>it he was half shaved and in
the shower when he heard the gunshot (T. 3 7 8 ) . That testimony
was merely cumulative and corroborative of statements defendant
had made to Detective Edwards and other police officers wh: !e i+
his residence. Its i nclusi on i s pla •"••• ^ r ^ e s s ,

has ruled that statements taken in violation of Miranda rules are
admissible to impeach conflicting testimony of a defendant.
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714 (1975).

This position was followed by this Court in State v.

Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Kish, 28 Utah 2d 430, 503 P.2d 1208 (1972).

See also State v.
As applied to the

instant case, the use of defendant's statements for impeachment
purposes was permissible. 17
Finally, even if the trial court erred in failing to
suppress defendant's statements, more than enough other evidence,
much of which defendant fails to mention in his summary of facts
in his brief, was admitted to sustain defendant's conviction, and
the error would be harmless.

In light of the compelling expert

testimony, the physical evidence and defendant's numerous
inconsistent statements to the 911 operator, Kris Knudson,
Sherrie Meyer, the poice officer who first arrived on the scene,
and others, no reasonable likelihood exists that without the
statements there would have been a different result.

See State

v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 129 (Utah 1986) (citing State v.

Even though defendant asserts a sixth amendment violation in
the present case, no sixth amendment right could have attached at
the time in question since no formal proceeding had begun. Even
if a sixth amendment right had attached, in Michigan v. Harvey,
110 S. Ct. 1176 (1990), the United States Supreme Court recently
ruled that a statement taken in violation of the Michigan v.
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) prophylactic rule (that once a
criminal defendant invokes his sixth amendment right to counsel,
a subsequent waiver of that right—even if voluntary, knowing and
intelligent under traditional standards—is presumed invalid if
secured pursuant to police-initiated conversation), may be used
by the prosecution to impeach a defendant's false or inconsistent
testimony. Ld. at 4288.
-38-

Hutchins.i.,

r--

K •

*s \, \ *^* j

UJTJLITi •

r •

« o^

;

J t a h

POINT VI

TESTIMONY CONCERNING SUSAN QUAS S STATfc ^ >"
MIND PRIOR TO HER DEATH WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED
t-

V ,

.JV

, .

*J

i- - - _- .*

*

4

* -•

inyone ; and parti^uiax^y
*oser v Wr i c» *'

pe 11 :c . ii.vti

testify.ng concerning certain statemei
i-j^tv
eftect LLai
WOUJ"

-

i

-r

* defendant

jno-

\r*e i f c

-

have been tr.e iP'iner^ .

-

' - =n

nose statements v^eie :-. . ne

ii4r li, : * .-.

* t'^iT'^nt-c w. „ i c \o*
Evi

• r•
- m

^ t:XLL-t,

in*

' " c i r , Y , f s t*-c;t n

*

concerr i n - * - d e c l a r a n t ' s

the:

exircj.j

^LQU

- ...

•^ e ^ i d ^ n c e would be
prejudicial
«

y

, presumaLJ.y t \ . , .s..

highi\

Eyid

•

i "4 i

Tne

r:r - • ' *, ' ' *• counsel ^n ":h^

which i1

issue
9~

,

*"f -*i!~ \ *

i.iJt..i.i»i ^ , ^ „ , iidit - . ^ u . . - : State v. Wauneka, c*

wci tr auaiefci^

•

defendant

,- irotjun

c

"

i
demonstrate

i. *,. „
-

.*

-oncerning

*•;.. ,i^t.^^\

J

•

(ute:.

•

.

t ».- j ; >11 >

1 \:

)

. >«- denied

,--•r-1.r*r1-

i *, :; itrSL*-.
assessing

r

?i

: :M ui SusdL

f->*

t

_u
ts;,mony
r_.pose

of

^

- jb! e-Wauneka requirements will
J

s ruling

In those

cases the Utah Supreme Court held that statements of a homicide
victim who reported threats of death or serious bodily injury by
the defendant in a case, under certain circumstances, could be
admitted under the state of mind exception of Utah R. Evid.
803(3).

To do so the statements could not be used to prove the

truth of the matter asserted and had to meet the following other
criteria:
(i) the evidence [must be] probative of
the decedent's state of mind at the time of
the killing, and (ii) the decedent's state of
mind . . . [must have] already been placed in
issue by defense evidence or argument that
the killing was (a) suicide, (b) in selfdefense, or (c) an accident to which the
decedent contributed by acting as an
aggressor.
State v. Auble, 754 P.2d at 937 (citing State v. Wauneka, 560
P.2d at 1380).

In addition, because of "that great potential for

unfair prejudice," such evidence should be admitted "only when it
is directly relevant to a material issue raised by the defense."
Id.

Finally, the Court considered a limiting instruction

concerning the use of such evidence a "per se requirement." Id.
In the instant case, each of the Auble-Wauneka
prerequisites was present.

First, the evidence was not only

probative of the decedent's state of mind, it spoke directly to
it and contradicted notions that she was suicidal.

Second, the

state of mind had already been raised by defendant in defense
counsel's opening argument and before the defense moved to
exclude fact statements.

In opening argument, the defense

counsel stated that the case was one of suicide, that the jury
would have "uncontroverted evidence concerning the state of mind

-40-

of

Snp^r {juri?

e ui ut
" [o]n

.- <•

1 r

^ ien t . h - t

-«-

ev Laenct

.

e~ death"

- r\:^* i'

*'

^fensn

std

-!

<

•

^

*hat
'

front

was i:/

'

<=*r f a c e .

She w^s

* ^.ated

ribu..../

i

^a.c t }H-J defense

:. ... .i-

^ is- ,nsta

.--*-.

suicide '.;

*,.^ .

dn«5an C

•lis0** by * !• - iefpnse.

t,\^ted

e]ither ^r wa -

.* uOi.:i Quas.

F: ~ » : 1 *
>
Supreme v.~navt

v

-.^] - t: * .,,: r -

- - rordanr * wi i h * he su : gestion hv the Utah

£i—™

instruct i nr. might

:>e^r\ m •• effective i; u . \ c
f

instiaLia.L:

+.:rv-,T.,

^ , - u i ^ .icuieuufc. I

, *r;n. court nere gave limiting

.: -

<-r~o

biate v. Aula!

.-.

the followinq

•

•

V

K

,

-eci'.f:^i

i'.he close ci the trial

' I O v.- X. \jt '•- - -

Statements of the decease'.
san Quas,
have been allowed as evidence ±i, uJ.s trial.
You are instructed that this testimony is t
be considered by yet onI\ in connection with
m a t i n g the state of mind of Susan Qua-,
its effect, if any, on her subseque
iurt. You are net tc consider this
7 to evaluate the state of r-:r
~ thp defendant 7 ^hr Qu-v
(R . 5 6 r

l

-

- * t.

lanqm"'"' ^ * *-* * -* • »
instil
reflecs
1

~-

.,;,
t:.- t r , •.

.

U '.

U JL '

* • rovai

ae a ' c a r e i u i l y
md 938 *

:

. *

ait

and s e n s ! .

• - u t, i o n ri T"y i n s t r u c t i on.

-4 1 -

i r a t u , x x i u ; * ig
Th-

rer. ; d
la

In light of the trial court's compliance with Auble and
Wauneka, the evidence in question was properly admitted at trial.
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED "FLIGHT" JURY INSTRUCTION AND
PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON REASONABLE
DOUBT.
A.

The Trial Court Properly Rejected Defendant's
proposed "Flight" Jury Instruction.

Defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing
to give the following "flight" instruction, as requested by
defendant:
The flight or attempted flight of a person
immediately after the commission of a crime
or after he is accused of a crime that has
been commited [sic], is not sufficient in
itself to establish his guilt; but such
flight, if proved, may be considered by you
in light of all other proven facts in the
case in determining guilt or innocense [sic].
On the other hand, the fact that a person did
not flee after the occurrence of an incident,
if proved, may also be considered by you in
light of all other proven facts in the case
in determining guilt or innocense [sic].
Consciousness of guilt may be inferred
from flight, however, it does not necessarily
reflect actual guilt of the crime charged,
and there may be reasons for flight fully
consistent with innocense [sic]. On the
other hand, lack of consciousness of guilt
may be inferred from the fact that a person
did not flee; however, it does not
necessarily reflect actual innocense [sic] of
the crime charged, and there may be reasons
for lack of flight fully consistent with
guilt. Therefore, whether or not evidence of
flight or lack of flight shows a
consciousness of guilt or lack of
consciousness of guilt and the significance,
if any, to be attached to any such evidence
are matters exclusively within the province
of the jury.

-42-

in denying the .requested instruction tv>
pi!

llltJUl;

', ,

i 11 i on i ii th^ r^r • * .-1

Requested by Defendant, i .
«.*...
Court, Court concluded that if this
instruction w a s given it in effect wou.u ^
commenting on non-evidence, —-^ ^!ear .'
should be ;>»*> to argument.

,T

--

••-*

Sur^eme C o u r t h a s s t a t e d th~*- " r-^+
_ must ? ^%

a l m o s t axiom.....
^videno- reflected

** - iecui

Fee^?

r e l a t i o n s h i p *.
, \n ~ v.

Adciit.

_/

•- Court *
l dl t j

ifial

a

3 i so

uultI.U>i

P'TV

.- t K ^ reauested instructic
D u m a s , ' - . ! , - .
" ^fir-ilt

• +• .

t " as t r t a . i . t t t - r-..-i.

iwi

!

' .

concern: r.-"- *
never .. r. . i

*' . -r
leave

\.t

~ f f ?red

emai:,

5 residence ^,Au aerencu
e^" eTcrnitie^* in: n.

-i *-•-. :

theory

did net

*:!*-*- a - ^ i

I ^ ^ F , -I *

. . .

ufcibiua:/

lthouqh d^fe^dart

name a i t e :

.e

r : >

•

court ' s rc-r ^a^ w~ *::ciude the proposes

* uiai

nstruction VaJ

appropriate.
Moreover, the requested _::...•,.
jnstri
8,

i n/*> nature t;n those already g:v<*

' *

"

.structions

l|

, I" jntl II ri|'|»i I.MMI LIML11 i 'v i'i*ncerning various categories

of evidence and the weight or: Uiieire..- *.. .

.r

ri

.

The proposed H u j M , instruction would have been cumulative l( and

-43-

defendant was not entitled to an instruction which was merely
redundant or repetitive of the court's instructions.

State v.

Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989) (citing State v.
McCumber, 672 P.2d 353, 354 (Utah 1980)).

In addition, "no

prejudicial error occurs if it appears that the giving of the
requested instruction would not have affected the outcome of the
trial."

State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d at 359; see also State v.

Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1146.

In the instant case it is

inconceivable that the absence of the proposed instruction would
have in any way affected the trial's outcome.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury
as to What Constitutes a Reasonable Doubt.

Defendant asserts that the trial court committed error
in denying defendant's motion to strike the jury panel.

That

motion was made on the basis of statements made by the trial
court during voir dire.

On the first day of trial, in the

preliminary stages of voir dire, the trial court spoke to all
prospective jurors concerning legal standards to be applied by
them.

Included in the trial court's discussion of reasonable

doubt were the following sentences:
A reasonable doubt is not one that is
merely possible, fanciful or imaginary,
because most everything relating to human
affairs is open to some possible doubt. . . .
But if after such impartial consideration
and comparison of all the evidence you can
truthfully say that you have an abiding
conviction of the Defendant's guilt such as
you'd be willing to act upon in the more
weighty and important matters relating to
your own affairs, you have no reasonable
doubt.
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Accordingly, the judge may, over the
objection of the defendant's counsel, give
any instruction that is in proper form,
states the law correctly, and does not
prejudice the defendant. State v. Piper, 113
Ariz- 390, 393, 555 P.2d 636, 639 (1976).
However, all instructions are subject to the
general and overreaching rule that the judge
must make it clear to the jury that the
defendant has "no particular burden of proof
but [is] entitled to an acquittal if there
[is] any basis in the evidence from either
side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt
that the defendant [is] guilty of the
offense." State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695
(Utah 1980) . . . .
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986).
Here, the trial court fully and correctly instructed
that defendant was entitled to a presumption of innocence
(Instructions 7; R. 574), that the State carried the burden of
proving all essential elements of the crime (Instructions 7 and
12; R. 574, 579) and that the State must prove that defendant
acted with the requisite intent (Instructions 12-18; R. 579-85).
The trial court gave the following reasonable doubt
instruction:
All presumptions of law, independent of
evidence, are in favor of innocence. A
defendant is presumed innocent until he is
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is
entitled to an acquittal.
The burden is on the State to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not
require proof to an absolute certainty. A
reasonable doubt is based on reason and
common sense and not on speculation or
imagination. It is a doubt that is
reasonable in view of all of the evidence.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must satisfy
the mind and convince those who are bound to
act conscientiously upon such proof. A
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:

the evidence, A reasonable doubt is a doubt
which reasonable men and women would
entertain, and it must arise from the
evidence or the lack of evidence in this
case.
If, after an impartial consideration and
comparison of all the evidence in the case,
you can candidly say that you have the kind
of doubt which would cause a person to
hesitate to act, you have a reasonable doubt.
Deciding that someone has committed a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt is different
from making decisions concerning the more
weighty affairs of life. In such affairs of
life, a person looks forward and, based on a
degree of hope, determination and personal
resolve, makes a decision that involves a
degree of risk. However, this decision is
revocable or at least salvageable.
A decision to convict or not looks
backward. It is always irrevocable as to
your decision. It demands reason,
impartiality and common sense. You must have
a greater assurance of correctness of this
decision than you normally have in making the
weighty decision in your life.
In so rejecting, the court noted the following:
Requested by defendant, but not given by
the Court (instruction #7 given). The
reference to "more some potential for
misleading the jury as to what" "reasonable
doubt" is, the "irrevocable" reference might
mislead the jury to the conclusion that the
defendant is without any remedies, such as
new trial, appeal, parole, etc., and make
[sic] suggest something absent the severity
of the penalty, without regard to the options
available to the sentencing judge.
(R. 596).
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in
rejecting defendant's proposed instruction, which clearly was an
attempt to exploit the Johnson and Ireland authority in an
overreaching manner, and in giving the cited instructions. That,
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APPENDIX A

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (Supp. 1989).
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any
court of record involving a charge of a
first degree or capital felony;
Utah R. Evid. 702 (Supp. 1989):
If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
Utah R. Evid. 702 (Supp. 1989):
The facts or data in the particular case
upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made
known to him at or before the hearing. If of
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence.

